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ARTICLES
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF
SEEKING TRUTH AND JUSTICE
DEAN ROBERT GILBERT JOHNSTON*
SARA LUFRANO**

"The purpose of a lawsuit is to arrive at the truth of the
controversy, in order that justice may be done."1 It is one of the
"decencies of civilization that no one would dispute."2
INTRODUCTION

Litigation accomplishes the purpose of truth seeking by
employing the adversary system.3 The adversary system is based
on the assumption that the truth of a controversy will best be
arrived at by granting the competing parties, with the help of an
advocate, an opportunity to fight as hard as possible.4 Few
systems rely more on the self-interests of the participants.! The
system operates on the assumption that the self-interests of the
combatants will clash so as to hone the issues in such a way as to
find the truth, and thus, reach a just result.'
The adversary system has been compared to the Church's
canonization of Saints.7 In the canonization process, a "devil's
advocate" is appointed with the designated purpose of compiling
all the reasons to oppose canonizing the person in question.8 The
*
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1. Edward F. Barrett, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy,
37 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 479+ (1962) (quoting DWIGHT G. MCCARTY,
PSYCHOLOGY & THE LAW 223 (1960)).
2. Barrett, supra note 1, at 479 (quoting Mich. Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228
U.S. 346, 353 (1913)).
3. Id. at 479-80.
4. Id. at 480.
5. RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 8 (2d
ed. 1997).

6. Id.
7. Barrett, supra note 1, at 480-81.
8. Id.
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underlying theory behind the procedure is that the truth is best
served by placing the responsibility on the parties themselves to
formulate their case and destroy the case of their adversary.9 This
rationale is identical to that of the adversary system.
There are at least three sides to every dispute.
The
adversaries introduce facts that each thinks are relevant and
material. Each set of facts comprises one side of the dispute. The
third side to the dispute consists of the sum of those facts.
Because the sum of the facts is not always relevant and material,
the adversary system regulates the conduct of each participant's
attorney and the process of discovery. The adversary system's
ultimate purpose is to best find the facts and resolve the dispute.
The rules set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") and the rules of discovery in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure help to achieve this purpose.
Adhering to the Model Rules is a responsibility of every
attorney.' °
As an example, Illinois has adopted a set of
professional conduct rules, the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct, ("Illinois Rules") which are similar to the Model Rules."
These rules are mandatory" as are the rules of discovery. 3
Violations of either of these sets of rules subject an attorney to
possible sanctions. In addition to these rules, there are Codes of
Civility that are merely precatory.14 Illinois has adopted such a
Code of Civility. These rules and codes attempt to balance the
tension between an attorney's responsibility of seeking the truth
and being an advocate. As a safeguard, the court also possesses
the inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct in litigation. '5
Part I of this Article discusses the Model Rules. It begins
with a brief history of the Model Rules and continues with a
discussion of various rules that give rise to an attorney's various

9. Id. at 480.
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl.

11 (1999) (stating that

"[e]very lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.").
11. See generally ILLINOIS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1999).
12. See ILLINOIS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (1999) (stating that
"[vliolation of these rules is grounds for discipline").
13. Spain v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 710 N.E.2d 528, 537 (Ill. App.

Ct. 1999).
14. See Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal
Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441, 448 (1992) (listing the proposed standards for

professional conduct in the Seventh Circuit). In the Preamble to this Civility
Code, the authors specifically state that the code is "voluntary," "designed to
encourage," and "shall not be used as a basis for litigation or for sanctions or

penalties." Id.
15. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) (holding that
"a court may assess attorney's fees when a party has 'acted in bad faith

vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons."') (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)).
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duties. Part II of this Article discusses the rules of discovery
contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the possible
sanctions imposed if one violates them. Part III of this Article
begins by comparing an attorney's duty to the public as an officer
of the court with his duty to his client. Part III concludes with a
discussion of the rules of discovery and how these rules should be
interpreted to best support the adversary system in arriving at the
truth of a lawsuit.
I.

THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

In 1887, a formal code of legal ethics was first adopted in the
United States by the State of Alabama. 6 The American Bar
Association ("ABA") responded twenty years later with the
promulgation of its Canons of Professional Ethics. 17 The Canons
remained in effect for sixty-one years 8 and were then replaced by
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 9 Less than ten
years later, the ABA established the Kutak Commission to draft a
0
new code of conduct for attorneys."
The Commission's work
resulted in the ABA's 1983 enactment of the Model Rules." These
rules constitute the current articulation of the legal profession's
ethical norms." The Model Rules prescribe many of a lawyer's
professional responsibilities."
Encompassed in these rules of
professional conduct are duties an attorney owes to the public, the
court, his or her adversary, and his or her client. Part A of this
Section discusses the duty an attorney owes to the public. Part B
discusses the attorney's duty to the court. Part C discusses the
attorney's duty to his or her adversary and lastly, Part D discusses
an attorney's duty to his or her client.
A.

Duty to the Public

A lawyer is "a public citizen having [a] special responsibility
for the quality of justice." 24 As a member of the public, an attorney
has a duty to improve the legal system, to uphold justice, and to
improve the level of legal services provided by members of the
profession. 2'5 Although no single rule precisely covers an attorney's

16. Christopher W. Deering, Candor Toward the Tribunal: Should An
Attorney Sacrifice Truth and Integrity For the Sake of the Client? 31 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 59, 67 (1997).
17. Id. at 68.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
Deering, supra note 16, at 73.
Id.

23. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl. (1999).

24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 5.
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duty to the public, the underlying purpose of all of the rules is to
protect the public. The Preamble to the Model Rules states that:
"[1]awyers play a vital role in the preservation of society."26 In
order to satisfy that role, a lawyer must understand how he or she,
as an individual, relates to the legal system as a whole.2 7 "The
Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to
define that relationship."'
B.

Duty to the Court

An attorney is an "officer of the legal system."2 9 As an officer
of the legal system, an attorney has a duty to bring before the
court only claims that have merit. ° An attorney also has a duty as
the court's officer to make all efforts possible, while maintaining
his or her client's interests, to expedite a lawsuit." Lastly,
an
attorney, as officer of the court, has a general duty of "candor" to
the court." Encompassed in this general duty of candor is the duty
26. Id. at 12.
27. Id.
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl. 1 12 (1999).
29. Id. at 1.
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1999) (covering
"meritorious claims and contentions"). Rule 3.1 states:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal
proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in
incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require
that every element of the case be established.
Id. See also ILLINOIS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (2002) (containing
the same language as the Model Rules Rule 3.1). The court referred to the
latter part of Rule 3.1 in United States ex rel. Bell v. Klincar when it stated
that even if the attorney knew that his client was guilty in the underlying
cause of action, he still had a duty to obtain any "truthful exculpatory
testimony." 1993 WL 243188, *3 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 1993).
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1999) (covering the
expedition of litigation). "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client." Id. See also ILLINOIS
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (2002) (containing the same language as
the Model Rules Rule 3.2).. The court in In re Smith held that an attorney
violated Rule 3.2 of the Illinois Rules in the handling of five marriage
dissolution cases. 659 N.E.2d 896, 902-03 (Ill.
1995). In one case, the attorney
was retained in May 1991. Id. at 901. The client paid the attorney fees by
August 1991. Id. The attorney did not complete the case for three years. Id.
The attorney handled the other marriage dissolution cases similarly. Id. at
902.
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1999) (covering an
attorney's general duty of candor to the court). Rule 3.3 also states that the
duties of candor to the court continue throughout the legal proceeding and
must be followed even if it means that otherwise protected information under
Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality) must be disclosed. Id. at 3.3(b). Model Rule 3.3
further states "[a] lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer
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to refrain from knowingly making misrepresentations of material
facts or law to the court.3 The duty of candor also includes the
positive duty to disclose to the court material facts that, if not
disclosed, would cause the attorney to assist his or her client in a
criminal or fraudulent act.34 The duty of candor to the court also
includes the positive duty to disclose to the court controlling legal
authority that the attorney knows is directly adverse to his or her
reasonably believes is false." Id. at 3.3(c). Finally, Model Rule 3.3 states that
"[fln an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material
facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed
decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." Id. at 3.3(d). See also ILLINOIS
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (2002) (containing all of the requirements
of Model Rule 3.3 and eleven additional requirements). These additional
requirements of Illinois Rule 3.3 are that an attorney, who appears in front of
the court, shall not:
(5) participate in the creation of or preservation of evidence when the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know the evidence is false;
(6) counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows to be illegal
or fraudulent;
(7) engage in other illegal conduct or conduct in violation of these rules;
(8) fail to disclose the identities of the clients represented and of the
persons who employed the lawyer unless such information is privileged

or irrelevant;
(9) intentionally degrade a witness or other person by stating or alluding
to personal facts concerning that person which are not relevant to the
case;
(10) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence,
assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a
witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or
innocence of an accused, but a lawyer may argue, on analysis of
evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matter stated
herein;
(11) refuse to accede to reasonable requests of opposing counsel that do
not prejudice the rights of the client;
(12) fail to use reasonable efforts to restrain and to prevent clients from
doing those things that the lawyer ought not to do;
(13) suppress any evidence that the lawyer or client has a legal
obligation to reveal or produce;
(14) advise or cause a person to become unavailable as a witness by
leaving the jurisdiction or making secret their whereabouts within the
jurisdiction; or
(15) pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a
witness contingent upon the content of the witness' testimony or the
outcome of the case ....
ILLINOIS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(515) (2002).
An Illinois court held that Illinois Rule 3.3(a)(11) and (13) were violated when
an attorney, during a deposition of his client, directed his client not to answer
questions that the court had approved and had ordered to be answered.
Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 828 F. Supp. 594, 603 (C.D. Ill.
1992).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1999).
34. Id. at 3.3(a)(3).
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client's interests that the opposing party has failed to disclose.35
Lastly, an attorney, as a court officer, must not knowingly present
any false evidence, and if he or she finds out that material
evidence is false after it has been presented, he or she must
remedy this.36 The duty of candor to the court is set forth in Rule
3.3 of the Model Rules and the Illinois Rules.
C. Duty to the Adversary
An attorney has a duty to the opposing party to the lawsuit
and the opposing counsel.37 This duty is defined in Rule 3.4 of the
Model Rules and the Illinois Rules. Encompassed in this duty is
the duty to refrain from unlawfully interfering with the opposing
party's access to any evidence.38 An attorney may not interfere
with the access to evidence him or herself by assisting another
party in doing so." This duty to one's adversary also prohibits an
attorney from falsifying evidence, from advising or helping a
witness who intends to testify falsely, and from offering an illegal
inducement to a potential witness. 4' This duty also prohibits an
attorney from knowingly failing to obey a rule of the court.41 It
prohibits an attorney from making frivolous discovery requests or
unreasonably failing to comply with an opposing party's proper
discovery requests.2 It also prohibits an attorney from addressing
any irrelevant issue at trial.43 An attorney is also prohibited from
asserting any factual, personal knowledge, except when he or she
acts as a witness, or from asserting any personal opinions."
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3.3(a)(4). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1999)

(covering the duties owed by an attorney to the opposing party and opposing
counsel).

37. See MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1999) (defining a
lawyers' duty to opposing counsel and fairness to the opposing party).
38. Id. at 3.4(a). The court in U.S. v. Hunter stated that an attorney "may
have" violated Rule 3.4 of the Illinois Rules by "unlawfully obstruct[ing]

another party's access to evidence" when the attorney removed boxes of money
from the defendant's home, thus preventing the police from acquiring this
evidence. No. 93 CR 318, 1995 WL 12513, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1995).
The court, in Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., held that an attorney
violated Rule 3.4(a)(1) of the Illinois Rules by unlawfully interfering with the
opposing party's opportunity to obtain evidence when he raised meritless
objections based on the attorney client privilege and when he ordered his
client not to answer the opponent's questions based on the same meritless

objections. 828 F. Supp. 594, 603 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (1999).
40. Id. at 3.4(b).
41. Id. at 3.4(c). This rule does not apply if the attorney openly refuses to
disobey a duty because he or she believes that no valid duty exists. Id.
42. Id. at 3.4(d).

43. Id. at 3.4(e).

This includes those issues that are unsupportable by

admissible evidence. Id.
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e) (1999). This rule applies
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Lastly, the attorney's duty to his or her opponent includes the duty
to refrain from asking any person, other than his or her client, to
refuse to volunteer any relevant information.45
D. Duty to the Client
Encompassed in the Model Rules are many duties an attorney
owes to his or her client. These duties include the duty of
competence,46 the duty of diligence and promptness,47 the duty of
communication,48 the duty of confidentiality,49 and the duty of
loyalty. ° These duties are similarly prescribed in the Illinois
Rules. 5'
II. RULES 26 AND 27 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide guidelines for an
attorney to follow in the discovery process of civil litigation. The
rules also include sanctions to be imposed when an attorney fails
to follow these guidelines.
Rule 26 covers the general provisions governing the discovery
process and the attorney's duty of disclosure.52 Rule 26(b)(1)
permits discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action . .. ."" Thus,
Rule 26 contemplates the discovery of all admissible evidence and
anything that is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."'
Rule 37 deals with an attorney's failure to make or cooperate
in discovery and the sanctions to be imposed when such failure
55

occurs.

to an attorney's personal opinion regarding whether the cause is just, whether
the witness is credible, whether the civil litigant is culpable or whether the
accused is guilty or innocent. Id.

45. Id. at 3.4(f). This rule does not apply if the person is a relative, an
employee or an agent of a client; and if the lawyer reasonably believes that the
person's interests will not be harmed by refusing to give the information. Id.
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1999) Rule 1.1.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1.3.
1.4.
1.6.
1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12.

51. See ILLINOIS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2002) Rule 1.1 (describing the

duty of competence); Rule 1.3 (describing the duty of diligence); Rule 1.4

(describing the duty of communication); Rule 1.6 (describing the duty of
confidentiality); Rule 11.12 (discussing various duties of loyalty that arise in
conflict of interest situations).
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (including provisions addressing discovery scope,

exemptions and trial preparation).
53. Id.
54. See Schaap v. Executive Indus., Inc., 130 F.R.D. 384, 386 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (requiring sanctions if the discovery rules are
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III. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING A
TRUTHFUL AND JUST OUTCOME
The adversary system is the system employed in the United
States to resolve litigation disputes. It relies on the "unshakable
foundation that truth is the object of the system's process which is
designed for the purpose of dispensing justice."56 If the system
allows any untruthfulness or lack of candor to exist, the process
loses validity.57 If the adversary system loses*validity, there will
no longer be any reason for the system to continue. 8 To assure
that a truthful and just outcome results, attorneys are bound by

the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the state in which
they practice. In addition, because discovery plays a major role in
arriving at the truth of a lawsuit, attorneys are also bound by the
rules of discovery within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Part A of this Section discusses the conflict that arises when
an attorney's duties to the public and to his or her client arise out
of the same situation and how an attorney should solve that issue
when it arises. Part B of this Section discusses the rules of
discovery contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
how those rules should be interpreted to arrive at the truth in a
lawsuit.
A.

The Conflict in the Duty an Attorney Owes to the Public and to
His or Her Client

"A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice." " Normally, these responsibilities interplay
harmoniously. 5 However, in the course of practicing law, conflicts
do arise.6' The attorney is then confronted with the issue of whose
interests he or she must further. The Model Rules prescribe terms
in an attempt to resolve conflicts an attorney confronts due to his
or her varying duties to the public, the court, his or her adversary,
and his or her client. 2
However, these rules do not precisely solve the issue of whose
interests are paramount - the court's or the client's. This Article
proposes that it is the court's interests that must be furthered
before the client's.
An attorney's duty to his or her client has been considered by

violated).
56. U.S. v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir. 1993).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1999)

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

Pmbl.

1 1.
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some to be above all others. 3 Lord Brougham, in 1818, made a
famous statement to the House of Lords in defense of Queen
Caroline:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
the entire world, and that person is his client. To save that client by
all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other
persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty;
and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.6
However, in response, a wise commentator and contemporary
of Lord Brougham, stated the opposite view:
The lawyer is not a hired mercenary; nor a hired vilifier of the other
side; but rather is to be compared to the noble knights of the middle
ages, who were professional warriors in the interest of truth and
justice; who donned their armor and fought; their oath was to
conquer or die on the field of honor, but they were to conquer in a
fair and open fight.65
This Article agrees with the latter statement rather than the
former. An attorney, of course, may not forsake his or her client.
However, his or her first obligation is to promote justice for all
parties to the lawsuit."
The United States Supreme Court, as stated in Theard v.
United States, agrees.
The Court quoted Justice Cardozo then
judge, of the New York Court of Appeals as saying that
"[m]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions."6
The Court went on to say, in reference to the
attorney/appellant in the case, that he became a member of "that
ancient fellowship" that is the bar for more than personal
interests.6 9 The Court stated that, when an attorney becomes a
member of the bar, he or she becomes an "officer of the court," and,
as such, becomes, similar to the court, "an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice."0
The Honorable Marvin E. Aspen of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois agrees, as stated in his
article entitled, "Let Us Be 'Officers of the Court."'' Judge Aspen
responds to the argument used by "Rambo-style" attorneys in
defense of their uncivil tactics that they are merely zealously
63. Deering, supra note 17, at 64.
64. See id. at 69 (citing 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 63.
67. 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
68. Id. (quoting Matter of Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917)).

69.
70.
71.
(July

Id.
Id.
Hon. Marvin E. Aspen, Let us Be 'Officers of the Court' 83 A.B.A. J. 94
1997).
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representing their clients.7" He states that the notion that one's
duty to his or her client could precede one's duty of professionalism
is "indefensible as a matter of law."73
Illinois courts agree that attorneys are "officers of the court"
and, as such, owe their primary duty to the administration of
justice.74 If an attorney's duty to his or her client ever conflicts
with the duty he or she owes to the public as its "officer," he or she
must first recognize his or her duty to the public. 5 If an attorney's
priorities were not first to the public, and then to his or her client,
the principles of justice would not be served. 76 This principle of
utmost loyalty to the public and to the court is recognized in
several Illinois cases including Caruso v. Murphy,77 Cannon v.
Loyola University of Chicago,7 and Castillo v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.79
1.

Carusov. Murphy

Caruso v. Murphy involved a paternity suit.8" The petitioner
claimed that the respondent was not the father of her child despite
the following facts: (1) the petitioner and respondent were living
together at the time of the child's conception; (2) the respondent
was in the hospital delivery room when the petitioner gave birth to
the child; (3) the respondent was named as the child's father on
the child's birth certificate and the petitioner certified this
information; and (4) blood tests showed a 99.99% probability that
the respondent was the father of the child.8' Despite these facts,
the petitioner and her attorney continued to challenge the
respondent's paternity claim.82 The trial court sanctioned both the
petitioner and her attorney for filing frivolous pleadings and
awarded the respondent his attorney's fees and costs.83
On appeal, the attorney claimed that he was "obliged" to
bring forth the lawsuit because his client denied the respondent's
paternity.' In response, the court strongly rejected the idea that
an attorney could hide his wrongdoing by claiming that he did

72. Id. at 95.
73. Id.
74. Caruso v. Murphy, 542 N.E.2d 375, 379 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (quoting
Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D.Minn.
1984)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.

78. 676 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Il1. 1987).
79. 828 F. Supp. 594 (C.D. Ill.
1992).
80. Caruso, 542 N.E.2d at 376.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 377.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
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what his client asked him to do. 5 The court held that, although an
attorney has a professional obligation to his client, he must
dismiss a lawsuit that has no merit, even if his client objects to the
dismissal.86 The court used the "officer of the court" rationale and
stated that as court officers, attorneys owe their primary loyalty to
the administration of justice.87 The court further explained that if
ever a conflict arose between an attorney's competing duties, she
must first recognize her public duties.' The court concluded that,
if this were not the case, justice would not be served.8 9
2. Cannon v. Loyola University of Chicago
In Cannon v. Loyola University of Chicago, the plaintiff was a
rejected applicant of seven defendant medical schools." She had
sued each school to gain admission and each lawsuit was
dismissed.9 All seven schools, in a final judgment, were granted
their attorney's fees and costs due to the plaintiffs violation of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules.92 In addition, the plaintiff was
enjoined from filing additional claims arising out of her past
rejections from medical school.93 After an unsuccessful appeal of
the judgment, she insisted on challenging its enforcement.94 In
response, the court held both the plaintiff and her attorney in civil
contempt.95 Additionally, the court disqualified the plaintiffs
attorney, who was also the plaintiffs husband, from ever
representing her in any action arising out of her past medical
school rejections.96 The court stated that it was no excuse for the
attorney to say that he acted solely under the direction of his
client.9" The court stated that an attorney's "first duty is to the
administration of justice," and, if conflicting duties ever arise, "he
must give precedence to his duty to the public."98
3.

Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.

In Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Mr.
Walker was the attorney for the plaintiff, Dr. Castillo, in the

85. Caruso, 542 N.E.2d at 379 (quoting Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Ctr.,
Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1438 (4th Cir. 1985)).

86.
87.
88.
89.

Caruso, 542 N.E.2d at 379.
Id. at 379 (quoting Van Berkel, 581 F. Supp. at 1251).
Id.
Id.

90. Cannon, 676 F. Supp. at 825.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 826-28.

95. Cannon, 676 F. Supp. at 828.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 830.
98. Id.
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underlying suit.99 The defendants in the underlying suit were St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company and Burnham City
Hospital." Mr. Walker and his associate engaged in outrageous
discovery abuse during the :depositions of their client Dr.
Castillo.'01 The first deposition was taken without Mr. Walker's
presence but rather with his associate present.0 2 As a result of
this discovery abuse, the Judge assessed a fee to be paid equally
between Dr. Castillo and his attorney. 3 The Judge also directed
Dr. Castillo to answer the questions attempted at the earlier
deposition and directed his attorney to refrain from interfering
with the process."
Mr. Walker was present at the second
deposition where, again, similar instances of discovery abuse
occurred.'0 ' As a result of this second occurrence of discovery
abuse and the failure to abide by the previous court order, the
court dismissed Dr. Castillo's case with prejudice and placed Mr.
Walker in civil contempt.' In addition, because Mr. Walker's
conduct was so unprofessional, the court, exercising its inherent
power, suspended Mr. Walker from the practice of law for a
minimum of one year.107
One of Mr. Walker's arguments was that he was bound by his
duty to his client, Dr. Castillo, to respond as he did during the
second deposition despite the judge's order to refrain from
interfering."° The court dismissed this argument as meritless and
a mere attempt by Mr. Walker to mislead the court."' The court
used this argument as another example of Mr. Walker's unfit
character to practice law."'
B. The Broad Scope of Discovery Delimited by the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure
Discovery requests are given a liberal construction under the
Federal Rules."' The rules "permit discovery of any item relevant
99, Castillo, 828 F. Supp. at 596.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 596-97.

102. Id. at 596.
103. Id. at 597.
104. Castillo, 828 F. Supp. at 597.

105. Id.
106. Id. This is not the first time Mr. Walker was censured for disobeying a
court order. Id. at 603. See Kilpatrick v. First Church of the Nazarene, 538
N.E.2d 136, 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (entering judgment against Walker and

his client in the amount of $7,120.90 for the attorney's conduct). See also In
Re Joint E. and So. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 Bankr. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding Walker in contempt and fining him $81, 655.01).
107. Id. at 598, 604.
108. Id. at 600.
109. Castillo,828 F. Supp. at 600.
110. Id.
111. Schaap v. Executive Indus., Inc., 130 F.R.D. 384, 386 (N.D. Il. 1990).
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to any claim or defense of any party.""' 2 The test for relevance in
the area of discovery is extremely broad."3 In addition, the federal
rules grant district court judges discretion in overseeing the
discovery process; district court judges' decisions are only reviewed
for abuse of discretion."4 The liberal policy of the federal courts is
designed to achieve full disclosure prior to trial."' It was the
court's firm belief that litigation "ought not devolve into a game of
hide the ball.""6
In Moriarty v. LSC Illinois Corp., the plaintiff, Moriarty, sued
the defendant, LSC, for unpaid ERISA employer contributions
under a successor liability theory."'
Moriarty requested a
multitude of documents to be produced by LSC." 8 The court held
that all of these documents were discoverable and must be
produced." 9 The court explained that Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
requires all relevant information that is not privileged to be
produced if it relates to "the subject matter involved in the
pending action."12' Even if the information would be inadmissible
at trial, if it "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence," it is discoverable."'
In Craig v. Exxon, the plaintiff was terminated from
employment in 1996, allegedly because she was excessively absent
and tardy.'2 She believed that this was a pretext and that her
pregnancy was the actual reason for her termination.
During
discovery, the plaintiff requested that the defendant identify all
other employees who had received a final written warning for
112. Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v. BBMG Golf Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 641, 650 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
113. Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. D.P. Builders, Inc.,
No. 97 C 2496, 1997 WL G685021, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1997).
114. Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 206, 207 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
115. Vardon Golf Co., Inc., 156 F.R.D. at 650.
116. Peachtree Lane Assoc., Ltd. v. Granader, 188 B.R. 815, 824 n.7 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
117. Moriarty v. LSC Ill. Corp., No. 98 C 7997, 1999 WL 1270711, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 1999).
118. Id. at *2-3. The documents requested included all reports made by LSC

to any health, welfare, or pension plan; all payroll records including who was
receiving the payroll, the number of hours worked, the rate of pay, the type of
job, the withheld amount for federal taxes, social security, state taxes, cash
disbursements, cash receipts; annual earning records of each employee; a
record of all non-employee compensation; all documents showing any

ownership in LSC for the past three years; names of all employees, including
details about them, and who had any ownership interest in LSC by way of

profit sharing plans for the past three years. Id.
119. Id. at *3.
120. Id. at *4 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26).
121. Id.
122. Craig v. Exxon Corp., No. 97 C 8936, 1998 WL 850812, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 2, 1998).
123. Id.
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attendance, absences, "lates," "tardies," or "early quits," from
January 1, 1990, to the present.'24
She also requested the
identification of all employees who had reached the requisite
number of absences, "lates," "tardies," or "early quits," but did not
receive warnings. 2' Her last request was for all documents that
dealt with any attendance policy or the dissemination of any
attendance policy in effect between January 1, 1990, and
September 3, 1996.126 In response to these requests, the defendant
objected to producing any information from the time period prior
to 1995 or subsequent to 1996.127
The court compelled the
defendant to comply with the discovery request, holding that the
information sought by the plaintiff was well within the scope of
Rule 26.128 The court explained that the standard for discovery
under Rule 26 "is widely recognized as one that is necessarily
broad in its scope in order to allow the parties essentially equal
access to the operative facts. " 129
The scope of discovery should be construed broadly in order to
aid in the search for truth.2 ° Courts look unfavorably upon
anything that restricts its scope such as the attorney clients and
work product privileges.'
Thus, these privileges are narrowly2
construed to limit the effect they have on the discovery process. 1
The Seventh Circuit agrees that the scope of privileges such as
33
these "should be confined to the narrowest possible limits."
The interpretation of the Model Rules and the rules of
discovery affect the adversary system's ability to achieve its
purpose. Interpreting the Model Rules as holding an attorney's
duty to the public as officer of the court to be the attorney's first
priority and by broadly construing the rules of discovery, the
adversary system is supported in arriving at a truthful and just
result.
CONCLUSION

The ultimate purpose of the adversary system is to seek truth
and justice.
To achieve this purpose, the system regulates
attorneys' conduct through the Model Rules as adopted by each
124. Id.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Craig, 1998 WL 850812, at *1.

128. Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *1 (quoting Onwuku v. FederalExpress Corp., 178 F.R.D. 508, 516

(D. Minn. 1997)).
130. United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991).
131. Ziemack v. Centel Corp., No. 92 C 3551, 1995 WL 314526, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. May 19, 1995). See also Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc.,
152 F.R.D. 132, 135.

132. Allendale, 152 F.R.D. at 135.
133. Id.
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particular state and the Federal Rules. The Model Rules impose a
duty on attorneys, as officers of the court, and to the public. The
first priority of the adversary system is arriving at a truthful and
just result. Attorneys must remember that they are "officers of the
court" and, as such, owe primary allegiance to the administration
of justice." An attorney's duty to the public as an officer of the
court precedes his or her duty to the client.135
When courts interpret the rules of discovery contained in the
Federal Rules they must broadly construe them so that all
relevant evidence is disclosed. The Model Rules and the Federal
Rules, interpreted as this Article proposes, allow the adversary
system to go forward unharmed and also provide a safeguard
against the evil of human nature's self-interest.

134. Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Rd. Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D.
Minn. 1984).
135. Id.

